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Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: Either Or?*
Colonel Dennis L. Danielson
Introduction
On the night of 25 February 1991 an Iraqi Scud missile penetrated Patriot missile defenses and
slammed into the U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing twenty-eight U.S. personnel.1
Throughout the duration of the war Iraqi missiles terrorized Israel in an attempt to lure it into the war.
Despite the low accuracy of the Scuds and the fact they did not significantly threaten the allied forces,
they nevertheless forced the allies to expend time and energy on missile defenses and preparedness for
the possibility of chemical attack behind the front line.
In a broader sense though, the potential impact of Iraq’s missiles was far greater. If Iraq had
succeeded in getting Israel to retaliate, the allied coalition most likely would have broken and the final
outcome of the war would have fallen far short of the actual outcome. Iraq might have retained a sizable
armed force and weapons program. (It was not until after the war that UN inspectors discovered Iraq’s
nuclear and chemical weapons program was more fully developed than had been assumed possible.)
Foreseeing the potential break in the coalition, U.S. forces expended significant resources to locate and
destroy the Iraqi missile threat. However, despite this effort, Iraq continued to launch missiles up to the
very end of the war although the overall launch rate decreased. It seems this unsophisticated “straw”
missile almost broke the coalition “camel’s” back. Iraq was not deterred from launching missiles
despite the obvious capability of the allied coalition to inflict a crippling blow on Iraq.
As a result of the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its emphasis on
theater missile defenses (TMD) with the goal of building more capable TMD systems to counter threats
the United States is likely to face in future theater wars. In support of this aim, the United States began
discussions with Russia regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The purpose of these
discussions is to clarify the boundary between strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the
treaty, and tactical and theater ballistic missile defenses, which are not limited by the treaty.
Will this effort to clarify the ABM Treaty undermine the purpose of the treaty? Exactly what
capabilities does the United States need for theater missile defense? Does the ABM Treaty still serve a
purpose or is it outdated? Can we have both TMD and the ABM Treaty? To what extent should the
United States engage in cooperative TMD efforts with allies, Russia, or other states?
To answer these questions I will first review the historical factors that brought us the ABM Treaty
as well as the purpose and results of the treaty. This discussion will also summarize several significant
events that have occurred since the treaty was ratified in 1972. The purpose of this review is to place
the treaty in proper context and to establish a base for an analysis of current negotiations in the light of
past events. Since the current treaty negotiations concern the demarcation between the strategic defenses
the treaty was designed to limit and others that are permitted, I will begin by reviewing the reasons for
and purpose of the ABM Treaty. Without this understanding we might find ourselves undoing the past
without wanting to do so.
Second, I will discuss the likely threat the United States will face in the near future from theater
ballistic missiles. This discussion will also include an analysis of efforts to control the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Third, I will discuss current U.S. plans to develop
effective TMD systems and the concerns that these systems might have a negative impact on the ABM
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Treaty. Finally, I will conclude with recommendations to resolve these concerns and at the same time
meet the growing threat of theater ballistic missiles.
Historical Factors Related to the ABM Treaty
The historical factors that are pertinent to our discussion of the ABM Treaty can be traced from the end
of World War II through the Cold War that followed.
The Cold War and the ABM Treaty
On 6 August 1945 the United States dropped the world’s first nuclear weapon on Hiroshima. The U.S.
decision to use the bomb was based on the desire “to make a profound psychological impression on as
many of the inhabitants as possible” with the hope its use would end the war.2 On 9 August 1945 the
second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Japan surrendered less than a week later. Approximately
one hundred thousand people died and another one hundred ten thousand were injured out of a combined
total population of four hundred fifty thousand in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.3 Though
staggering, the number of casualties at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a result of the atomic bomb were
less for Japan and for the United States than if other military strategies were used to end the conflict. A
single, conventional Tokyo air raid on 10 March 1945 resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred
thousand people alone.4 Based on the “fight to the death” reputation of Japanese soldiers throughout the
Pacific theater, the United States expected that Japan was capable of enduring and inflicting many more
deaths if the war was to continue as it had been fought to that point. With this perspective in mind, use
of the atomic bomb seemed an acceptable choice to President Harry Truman.
While it ended one war, the nuclear bomb took us into another, the Cold War. The 1950s and
1960s were characterized by a seemingly endless expansion of U.S. and Soviet strategic military
capability. From the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), to sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, and multiple
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the development of new and more effective offensive weapons
and programs to build defenses and counter defenses seemed to go on without end.
In the midst of this expansion in offensive capability, the USSR sought to extend the influence of
communism by significant increases in foreign aid and arms exports throughout the world. Although
most countries who received Soviet foreign aid did not adopt the Leninist idea of a revolution of the
masses or embrace the ideology of communism, most were eager to receive Soviet arms and supported
at least some of the aims and goals of the USSR. Soviet foreign policy was almost exclusively
structured to counter the influence and threat perceived as coming from Washington (and to a lesser
degree a competition from Beijing in Asia).
When the United States improved relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq in 1954 and 1955, the
Soviet Union responded with foreign aid to Egypt, India, and Afghanistan. American influence in Israel
and Jordan was met with Soviet assistance to Syria and Yemen. The Soviets attempted to take
advantage of every failure in American foreign policy. With Fidel Castro’s successful revolution in
Cuba in 1959, the USSR gained an open door into America’s backyard.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet aid was used to cultivate opposition to the United States and
its policies throughout Latin America by supporting activities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay.  When the U.S. relationship with Turkey was strained as a result of the
1964 crisis in Cyprus, the Soviets were quick to respond by befriending Turkey. Though sidelined
during the 1967 six-day Israeli–Arab war and somewhat embarrassed by the dismal performance of
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Soviet equipment in that conflict, the USSR wasted no time in rearming the Arab states to the tune of
$2.5 billion in 1967 and 1968, almost as much as had been given during the previous twelve years.5
Also during the 1960s and early 1970s the Soviets provided additional foreign aid to India and, on
occasion to Pakistan, as a way to counter U.S. (and Chinese) influence. Though seemingly not
concerned about the growing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia in the early 1960s, the USSR
increased its supply of foreign aid and weapons to North Vietnam in 1965 and openly supported the
North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong throughout the war. When African states broke free from
colonial rule in the 1960s and early 1970s, the USSR sought to take advantage of every opportunity.
Soviet aid went to support instability in Zaire and Nigeria in the 1960s and in Somalia, Angola,
Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa in the 1970s. Overall Soviet arms sales went from
$500 million a year in 1955 to $5 billion a year in 1965.6
The rapid post-World War II expansion of strategic weapons, the clash of east–west ideology at
numerous points throughout the world, and the growing threat of a major nuclear conflict, spurred
efforts in the United States and in the USSR to develop civilian and national defenses. The concern
about nuclear war felt by people in the United States during the late 1950s led many to build backyard
fallout shelters. Schools instituted periodic air raid drills during which children were taught to crawl
under their desks and to shield their eyes from the expected flash of the nuclear burst. Both countries
conducted research and development to find effective ways to defend against a missile attack and each
made advances in technology to counter the expected defenses of the other (the United States
development of the MIRV for example). Although the United States established an early lead in the
development of nuclear weapons, the Soviets did not remain far behind; both sides acquired huge
nuclear arsenals of ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers.
As each side worked on development and anticipated deployment of a national anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) defense system, it became increasingly clear these defenses would only be marginally effective
because of the superiority of offensive missile technologies, including the use of decoys, MIRVs, and
other penetration aids. Namely, deployment of a missile defense system would most likely result in
still further increases in offensive strategic weapons in order to counter those missile defenses.
Therefore in 1969 the United States and USSR began negotiations to limit ABM defenses as a part of
broader Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in an acknowledgment that neither party could
achieve superiority or lasting security by simply increasing its arsenal of strategic weapons.
On 26 May 1972 President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed “The
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” more commonly known as the ABM Treaty. This
treaty prohibits the United States and the USSR from deploying national ABM systems for a “defense
of the territory of its country.”7 The treaty did, however, permit a very limited fixed, ground-based
ABM system to protect one ICBM field and the nation’s capitol. The 1974 Protocol to the treaty
further limits each nation to just one ABM site (either around the capitol or an ICBM field). The treaty
defines an ABM system as “a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles .!.!. currently consisting of
ABM interceptor missiles!.!.!., ABM launchers!.!.!., and ABM radars.”8 The treaty also prohibits
each side from giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, and radars the “capabilities to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight” and prohibits testing non-ABM missiles, launchers, and
radars “in an ABM mode.”9 These restrictions were designed to prevent the treaty from being
circumvented by giving other systems an ABM capability.
                                                
5. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, N.Y.: Macmillian,
1992), p. 194.
6. Ibid., p. 175.
7. Quote is from Article I of the treaty that reads as follows: 1) Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; 2) Each Party undertakes not to deploy
ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM
systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of the Treaty.
8. See Article II, paragraph 1 of the ABM treaty.
9. See Article VI of the ABM treaty.
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In conjunction with the ABM Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim
Agreement was signed by the United States and USSR to freeze the number of ICBM and SLBM
launchers. SALT was not subject to ratification as a treaty because it was intended to be a short term
agreement (up to five years) that would be superseded by a permanent treaty to reduce strategic arms.
Significance of the ABM Treaty.
The significance of the ABM Treaty is evident in the preamble that reads: (emphasis added)
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the
Parties, proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all
mankind, considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the
risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, proceeding from the premise that the limitation
of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of
strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further
negotiations on limiting strategic arms, mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions
in the strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, desiring to
contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows: . . .
As stated in this preamble, the goal of the treaty was to halt the race to produce more strategic weapons
(missiles) by limiting defenses against such weapons. The United States had gone from a 1950s and
1960s nuclear strategy based on superiority to one based on the acceptance of eventual parity, a strategy
that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
The earlier U.S. strategy of superiority had enabled the United States to exercise a strong hand
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Air Force crews in nuclear armed bombers sat with engines
running ready to respond to any conflict that might develop from a Soviet attempt to penetrate the U.S.
blockade of Cuba. The United States won the face-off with the Soviets on the basis of a conventional
and nuclear superiority. But by the early 1970s the gap in strategic capabilities between the United
States and the USSR had narrowed. Each party had a reasonable degree of confidence that a substantial
fraction of its strategic forces could survive the other’s first use of nuclear weapons and, therefore, it
was of limited utility to defend against such an attack. The United States placed great confidence in its
survivable SLBM force augmented by a strategic bomber and tanker force that remained on twenty-four
hour alert. The Soviets depended more on their overwhelming superiority in the number of ICBMs in
hardened silos.
The second observation to make from the preamble of the ABM Treaty is both parties
acknowledged a commitment and responsibility to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear
weapons in accordance with the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they signed in 1968. The
ABM Treaty along with the SALT I Interim Agreement was expected to cap the arms race and form the
basis for further agreements that would begin to reduce strategic arms.
Results of the ABM Treaty
What did the treaty achieve? What did it fail to accomplish? From the 1970s through the mid 1980s,
the Soviet Union increased its support of conflict aimed against the West. In Africa (Angola, Ethiopia);
Central and South America (Cuba, Nicaragua); Southwest Asia (Syria, Iraq); South Asia (India); and
Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos) Soviet aid grew rapidly. The Soviets became the leading world
supplier of weapons with military aid over the period from 1978 to 1986 totaling more than $137
billion.10 In addition, Soviet military forces were used in a more active role than during the 1950s and
1960s. In 1979 Soviet forces invaded neighboring Afghanistan demonstrating a resolve to commit
troops to support socialist regimes against the West.
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In nuclear technology, the Soviets were not content to achieve parity with the United States. A
U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency report published in 1978 compared forty-one different measures of U.S.
and Soviet strategic forces from 1960 to 1980. The report showed at the time of the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, the comparison favored the United States by a wide margin. However, by the mid 1970s,
the Soviets were ahead in all but eight categories.11 Though some disputed Soviet technology had
actually surpassed the United States, no one argued with the fact the Soviets had rapidly closed the gap
in the number of offensive weapons. The USSR very quickly duplicated U.S. nuclear technology in
almost every area and, similarly, in many areas of conventional weapons as well. Duplication of U.S.
technology was especially apparent in the similarity between Soviet and U.S. aircraft.
The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement did not halt the increase in the number and capability
of strategic warheads. The United States and USSR continued to deploy additional warheads by
deploying MIRVs that placed up to ten weapons on one missile. While keeping within the Interim
Agreement on overall limits in the number of ICBM and SLBM launch tubes, the goal of limiting or
reducing strategic warheads was circumvented. As the Table 1 shows, from 1972 to 1985 the U.S.
strategic warhead count went from approximately six thousand to more than ten thousand and the
Soviet warhead count went from approximately twenty-one hundred to approximately ten thousand
while the total number of delivery systems (ICBM and SLBM launch tubes) remained relatively
constant. Each country continued to invest in technologies to improve accuracy, survivability, and
reliability of its strategic systems during this period.
The ABM Treaty did have two positive outcomes. First, the treaty saved the United States the expense
of deploying and operating a large national missile defense system. Both states were limited by the
treaty (and the 1974 Protocol) to field only one ground-based ABM site with a maximum of 100 ABM
interceptors. The United States initially deployed an ABM system (called Safeguard) near Grand Forks
Air Force Base, North Dakota, but shut it down during its first year of operation because of serious
concerns about its operational and cost effectiveness. Safeguard depended on an exo-atmospheric (outer
space) ABM interceptor called the Spartan and a lower altitude, endo-atmospheric interceptor called the
Sprint. Since both the Spartan and Sprint were nuclear tipped, it was highly probable the nuclear
effects of a few Spartan warheads would “blackout” the ABM radar and “shoot itself in the foot” so to
speak. (Note: The Limited Test Ban was signed in October 1963 by the United States, UK, and USSR
to prohibit outer space nuclear tests after it became obvious that other, related nuclear weapons effects
from actual tests had caused serious damage to satellites and global communication systems.) Even if
                                                
11. William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, Strategic Options for the Early Eighties, monograph by National
Strategy Information Center, Inc. (White Plains, N.Y.: Automated Graphic Systems, Inc, 1979), p. 5.
Table 1. Comparison of U.S. and USSR Strategic Systems, 1972 to 1990
1972 1980 1985 1987 1990
U.S.
     ICBM 1,054 1,054 1,018 1,000 1,000
     SLBM 656 656 616 640 624
     Bombers 455 338 180 317 306
     Warheads* 6,000 7,301 10,174 13,873 9,680
USSR
     ICBM 1,530 1,398 1,398 1,418 1,398
     SLBM 500 1,028 979 928 924
     Bombers 140 156 170 165 185
     Warheads* 2,170 6,000 9,987+ 11,044 10,996
Source: Information taken from various issues of The Military Balance, published annually by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Riverside, N.J.: Macmillian, 1990–1991): 212; (1987–1988):
225; (1985–1986): 180; (1990–1981): 3–4,90–91; (1972–1973): 84–85. Numbers used for “bombers” are
generally long range bombers. U.S. figures for 1972 and 1980 include FB-111s. U.S. nuclear bomber force
increased in 1987 with B-1 and conversion of older B-52 to nuclear ALCM role. Figures do not show relative
megatonage. Figures do not agree with other open source information but should be taken as a relative
measure of strategic capabilities.
Notes: * Does not include tactical nuclear warheads.
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all one hundred ABM interceptors worked as advertised, they would hardly protect the United States
against thousands of Soviet ICBM and SLBM warheads. After the site was closed as an ABM facility,
the long range radar was converted to a missile warning and space surveillance facility and is still in use
as of this writing. Unlike the United States, the USSR, however, continued to upgrade and maintain its
nuclear tipped ABM system near Moscow.
The second result of the ABM Treaty was it kept the door open for talks to continue on the
limitation and reduction of strategic weapons (SALT II, START I and II). In practice, the treaty created
the appearance of a willingness to agree to reduce nuclear weapons without either side having to make
any real sacrifices. Article XIII of the treaty created a Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) that
brought the United States and the USSR together on a regular basis to discuss a wide range of issues
concerning the treaty such as clarifications, possible violations, proposed changes, and so forth. The
treaty provided a starting point from which it was possible to discuss other negotiations about strategic
weapons in general. Although the United States and USSR continued to embrace opposing ideologies
for many years, each country remained committed to the belief the ABM Treaty was a worthwhile
means to hold the other’s strategic defenses in check.
Significant Events Since the ABM Treaty.
As was previously mentioned, the period from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s was a time of
unprecedented growth in the export of Soviet weapons and expansion of strategic forces. Ronald Reagan
was elected President in 1980 expressing a view shared by many Americans that the USSR was an
“evil empire.” In light of Soviet actions around the world, Americans were not put at ease by the
sustained strategy of MAD and the failure of the United States and the USSR to agree upon any
reduction in strategic forces. It was of little comfort to know the United States had no defenses against
ICBMs while the Soviets had an ABM system that offered some (although disputably little) protection
around Moscow.
Throughout the late 1970s and early 80s both countries had substantial research programs
underway to develop technologies that might increase their missile defense capabilities. The United
States effort to improve missile defenses came into prominence following a nationally televised speech
made by President Reagan on 23 March 1983. In this speech, Reagan announced the start of a major
initiative that would have as its aim to field a strategic missile defense system to render ballistic
missiles “impotent and obsolete.”12 President Reagan’s idea, quickly labeled “Star Wars” by its critics
and the press, became the Pentagon’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
As one might expect, the Soviets were quick to express criticism of SDI as impractical,
unbelievable, and also a violation of the ABM Treaty. Privately they were probably concerned the
United States might in fact have achieved a technical break-through that would let it develop effective
defenses and lead to a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—Article XV of the treaty allows either party to
withdraw after a six month advance notice.
As the SDI program got under way, a debate soon developed over what was and what was not
allowed by the ABM Treaty. In October of 1985, President Reagan’s national security advisor, Bud
McFarlane, stated during a nationally televised interview that the President was:
.!.!.!guided by the ABM Treaty, and the terms of that treaty are very explicit in Articles II, III, IV,
and V, plus Agreed Statement D. They make it clear that on research involving new physical
concepts, that that activity, as well as testing, as well as development, indeed, are approved and
authorized by the treaty. Only deployment is foreclosed, except in accordance with Articles XIII and
XIV.13
The debate grew into a major political battle among arms control advocates, the administration,
Congress, and the Soviets. The traditional interpretation of the treaty (later known as the “narrow
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13. George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York, N.Y.: Macmillian, 1993), p. 578.
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interpretation”) was that the United States and USSR could not develop, test, or deploy any ABM
systems except fixed, ground-based systems. This view is based on Article V that reads in part as:
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components that are sea-
based, spaced-based, or mobile land-based.
In other words, SDI efforts not devoted to fixed, land-based ABM systems were limited to research
only.
Mr. McFarlane’s statement challenged this point of view by claiming Agreed Statement D of the
treaty (made at the time the treaty was signed) exempted new “exotic” technologies from the traditional
interpretation. Agreed Statement D states (emphasis added):
Agreed Statement [D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components
except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based
on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such
systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and
agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
The view expressed by Mr. McFarlane became known as the “broad interpretation.” Those opposed to
the broad interpretation included most of the U.S. team that had negotiated the ABM Treaty.
As the debate grew during the mid-1980s two extremes developed. At one extreme, SDI supporters
wanted to press for an aggressive effort to develop and deploy a variety of space-based and ground-based
ABM systems with or without the concurrence of the USSR (six month notice is all that is required to
withdraw from the treaty). At the other end of the spectrum, SDI opponents ridiculed the notion any
such defenses were technically or economically possible and even SDI research would undermine the
ABM Treaty. In between these two extremes were those who approved of SDI research and, although
skeptical about it’s potential, wanted to keep options open. Congressional restrictions attached to
appropriations bills limited SDI expenditures to only those programs that could be conducted within
the narrow or traditional interpretation.
From my analysis of the events that occurred during the 1980s that relate to the ABM Treaty, I
identify two points as most important. First, President Reagan was sincerely motivated by a desire to
rid the world of the threat of ICBMs. He was led to believe SDI research could develop a capability to
shield the whole world, including the USSR and not just the United States, from the threat of ballistic
missiles. At the Reykjavik conference in October 1986, President Reagan discussed at length a
proposal to share strategic defenses and eliminate offensive ballistic missiles before deployment of
defenses so neither side could have an effective first strike capability.14 At one point in the discussion,
the President expressed his desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons.15 However, Mr. Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, would make no agreement that did not
include strict language to restrict SDI research to the laboratory.
The second observation is thatthe Soviets were very concerned about SDI and feared American
technology in general. After the President’s 1983 SDI announcement, they sought at every corner to
press the United States to limit SDI research and development. At the same time several major trends
were developing in the USSR. The Soviet successes in the 1970s at home and abroad faded during the
1980s and by 1989 had given way to failures in agriculture, the domestic economy, technology, and
world trade. The USSR had became the world’s leading importer of grain.16 Soviet military strength
was slipping in comparison to the United States yet costing the Soviet government far more by
comparison as a percent of gross national product (GNP). The USSR pulled out of Afghanistan with a
sense of failure reminiscent of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The USSR had few non-military
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goods to offer the world, or its own people. Even its export of military goods began a rapid fall in
1987, from a 1986 high of 43 percent of the world’s market to 26per cent by 1991.17 In 1989, with
the Warsaw Pact crumbling around them, the Soviets were no longer in a position to negotiate from
strength. These facts coupled with the belief the U.S. Congress would keep (had kept) the Reagan and
Bush administrations’ SDI efforts within the bounds of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
brought the USSR to a point where they were prepared to make significant reductions in strategic
offensive weapons.
Many SDI opponents claim SDI kept the United States from reaching early agreements with the
USSR to reduce arms. Conversely, many SDI advocates claim it was, in fact, the U.S. position of
strength based upon the threat of SDI that finally led to successful negotiations with the USSR. I
believe neither claim is completely correct, but rather it was primarily the failure of the Soviet system
coupled with Soviet willingness to admit failure and recognize their inability to keep up with an
expanding U.S. and Western economic and technical base that brought the Soviets to accept deep cuts
in strategic weapons. An honest self examination told the Soviets they could not continue to finance
their security policy let alone upgrade it to stay on par with American technology. The Soviets saw
their only hope for survival was to reduce the size and expense of their military establishment so they
could devote more resources to a grossly neglected Soviet society.
As the world watched in amazement from 1989 to 1991, the Soviet Union let go of Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact folded, and the Berlin wall came down. On 30 July 1991 President George
Bush and Mr. Gorbachev signed START in Moscow. When fully implemented, this treaty will cut
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) to sixteen hundred and countable
warheads to six thousand, an amazing reduction of strategic nuclear forces by 30 to 40 percent.
Almost immediately after START was signed, a second round of talks began that were aimed at
further reductions in nuclear forces. At the same time, the United States took all strategic bombers off
alert status; stood down all ICBMs that were scheduled to be deactivated under START; halted
development of the rail garrison MX, the land-mobile Midgetman ICBM, and the Short Range Attack
Missile II; and announced plans to withdraw and destroy all nuclear artillery shells and all Lance nuclear
warheads, and remove all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines. Mr.
Gorbachev announced the USSR would respond in kind.
In October 1991 the U.S.–USSR talks on reductions in strategic weapons were expanded to include
representatives from the Soviet Republics that held nuclear weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus. Following the demise of the USSR in December 1991, the Lisbon Protocol was signed in
May 1992 by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the United States. Under this protocol, the
four republics of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus accepted START treaty successor status. In
signing the protocol, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus agreed to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear
states.
The START and post-START discussions were accompanied by a series of less publicized space
and defense negotiations about cooperation in missile defenses. In January of 1991 President Bush had
concurred with a DOD proposal to develop a non-nuclear U.S. ABM system called Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). This proposal represented an evolution of the SDI program
combined with a variation of a December 1989 proposal from Senator Sam Nunn called Accidental
Launch Protection System (ALPS).18 The concept of GPALS included a space-based element that
would not be in compliance with the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. With Iraq’s use of
missiles in the Gulf War that resulted in the deaths of American soldiers fresh in many minds, the
administration reinforced the argument that the United States needed a thin national ABM system to
defend against the threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch, or attacks from third world or
terrorist states like Iraq. As a result, the Bush administration laid out proposals in the SCC for changes
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to the ABM Treaty that would permit the development of GPALS. In July 1991 Mr. Gorbachev
proposed the development of a joint ABM early warning system to the Group of Seven (G-7), and in
October 1991 he further agreed to consider U.S. proposals for ABM systems. He also tabled the idea of
a joint ground and space based missile defense system.19
In November 1991 the U.S. Congress passed the Missile Defense Act that directed DOD to deploy
by 1996 a single site ABM system that would comply with the ABM Treaty. The Congress was, no
doubt, influenced by the Bush administration’s request for better missile defenses in light of the
experiences of the Gulf War. The Missile Defense Act also directed the Bush administration to discuss
ABM Treaty amendments with the USSR that would permit a national ABM defense system and
permit increased use of space-based sensors for direct battle management. These discussions were also
to clarify with the USSR the rules for testing ABM defenses with space-based components and the
demarcation between theater and strategic ABM defenses. However, on Christmas 1991 the USSR
ceased to exist.
In January 1992 Mr. Boris Yeltsin, President of the newly independent Russian Federation, echoed
Mr. Gorbachev’s previous call for a joint ABM system. In February 1992 at Camp David, Presidents
Bush and Yeltsin discussed the idea of joint defenses and shared concerns about threats, not from each
other, but from third world terrorist regimes who might acquire nuclear weapons and missiles. Finally,
in June 1992 Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a joint U.S.–Russian statement agreeing
.!.!.!that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in
developing a concept for such a Global Protection System as part of an overall strategy to counter
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.20
Their concept of a Global Protection System (GPS) called for a high-level group to explore the
potential for sharing early warning information through the establishment of an early warning center
and the potential for cooperation with other states in developing ballistic missile defense technologies.
The high-level group was also chartered to examine existing treaties and consider possible changes or
the need to develop new treaties to facilitate GPS.
The U.S.–Russian high-level group met in July 1992 in Moscow. The head of the Russian
delegation was Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov; the U.S. delegation was headed by U.S.
Chief of State Department Policy Planning Dennis Ross. The delegations agreed to create three lower
level working groups to examine issues in more detail. These working groups included a Global
Protection System Concepts Working Group, a Technology Cooperation Working Group, and a Non-
Proliferation Working Group;21 they met in September and October 1992. Following the U.S.
presidential elections in November 1992, U.S.–Russia talks were put on hold pending the change in
the U.S. administration.
Just prior to leaving office in January 1993 President Bush signed the START II treaty with
President Yeltsin in Moscow. When START II reductions are complete (by the year 2003, or by 2000
with U.S. assistance to Russia), each side will reduce strategic warheads to 3,000 to 3,500, limit
SLBM warheads to 1,700 to 1,750, and eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs and all heavy (Russian SS-18)
ICBM launchers in addition to the 1991 START reductions. START II will result in a total reduction
of U.S. and Russian strategic forces to about 25 percent of the pre-START levels.22
In April 1993 at Vancouver, President Bill Clinton had his first meeting with President Yeltsin.
The two agreed “it is necessary to achieve the earliest possible resolution of questions about
cooperation in nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology in all aspects.”23 Later the same
month President Yeltsin met with leaders of the Western European Union (WEU) and presented a
proposal that the United States and Russia should establish a joint early warning center that would use
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information from U.S. and Russian early warning systems.24 His proposal called for joint discussion
to examine the possibility WEU states could participate in GPS. The Clinton administration responded
to Yeltsin’s proposal by announcing it would continue the joint missile defense talks with Russia
begun under President Bush.25
Also in May 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization would be renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect a change
in the Clinton administration’s focus from concepts that included space-based global defenses to an
emphasis on mobile TMD systems. The Clinton administration proposed BMDO be funded at $3.8
billion for FY94, the same level of funding as in FY93 for SDIO. Of this amount, approximately $1.7
billion was requested for TMD, an increase by about $700 million more than FY93.  Only $1.2 billion
was requested for strategic missile defenses.26 This increase in emphasis and funding for TMD fell in
line with the results of Secretary Aspin’s “Bottom Up Review” of the DOD. The review, released in
October 1993, conceded the SDI research effort had failed to develop effective defenses against a large-
scale missile attack. It also acknowledged President Clinton’s skepticism about the need for GPALS
and concluded the greatest future threat was from the proliferation of theater ballistic and cruise missiles
armed with weapons of mass destruction.27 Finally in December of 1993 and with inputs from the
DOD, State Department, and National Security Council, the Clinton administration initiated an effort
to clarify with Russia the ABM Treaty as it pertains to strategic versus theater missile defenses.
In summary, concepts of missile defenses have gone from a limited ABM defense (Safeguard-
Nixon), no defense (Carter), a strategic defense umbrella (SDI- Reagan), a limited national defense
system (GPALS-Bush), and an international, global protection system (GPS-Bush) to the current
emphasis on mobile theater defenses over strategic missile defenses (TMD-Clinton). With this history
of missile defenses, I will now turn to an assessment of the theater ballistic missile threat the United
States faces and possible ways to meet that threat.
Threat and Efforts to Contain the Threat
What threat does the United States face in the future from theater ballistic missiles? Does a focus on
the threat of theater ballistic missiles occur at the expense of ignoring threats from other delivery
vehicles such as aircraft or cruise missiles? What means are available to control the proliferation of
ballistic missiles or nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction they might deliver,
and how effective are these means? It is important to address these questions before we can conclude the
United States needs such a capable TMD system it must engage in a process to clarify restrictions set
by the ABM Treaty, a treaty that was designed to limit strategic missile defenses, not TMD systems.
In World War II, Germany launched more than thirteen hundred V-2 ballistic missiles against
London and more than sixteen hundred against Antwerp.28 In the manner of those fired by Iraq during
the Gulf War, the German V-2 missile was of little use against military targets, but had significant use
as a weapon of terror. Sir Winston Churchill wrote that the V-2 “imposed upon the people of London a
burden perhaps even heavier than the air-raids of 1940 and 1941.”29 Churchill’s thoughts were echoed
by British writer Norman Longmate who interviewed thousands of Londoners who experienced the V-2
attacks.30 Also in a manner similar to the Iraqi Scuds used during the Gulf War, German V-2s diverted
Allied military efforts from other operations to target V-2 launch sites. The allies were just as
unsuccessful in locating and destroying mobile V-2s in World War II as were the allied forces in finding
Scuds during the Gulf War.
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Like a very long range piece of artillery, the ballistic missile delivers a warhead with no warning.
Terrible enough as the delivery vehicle of a conventional warhead, a ballistic missile’s effects can be
greatly multiplied with the use of a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead. These weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), like conventional weapons, can also be delivered via aircraft, artillery, and cruise
missiles, or by means of covert, terrorist actions. But the ballistic missile stands above other means of
delivery in its ability to deliver (as a function of the missile-size and range) a large warhead long
distances in the minimum amount of time and at a cost that is deemed affordable by many countries.
Once launched, whether by intention or in error, a ballistic missile cannot be recalled. (Only test
missiles normally have self-destruct systems on board.) A ballistic missile requires no pilot and no in-
flight refueling or stop at an enroute airfield. Because the ballistic missile travels at a significantly
higher velocity than an aircraft and is a smaller target, the problem of defending against ballistic
missiles is a far greater challenge. It is precisely because of these factors that the German V-2 was
viewed as a more serious threat to Londoners and caused serious morale problems despite the fact there
were only about twenty-five hundred deaths in London from V-2s compared to more than five thousand
deaths from the V-1 cruise missile and more than one hundred twelve thousand from aircraft.31 It is
because of the inherent capabilities of the ballistic missile (warhead delivery weight, range, speed, and
problems to defend against) that the ICBM and SLBM, more so than the intercontinental bomber, form
the basis of U.S. and USSR or Russian strategic nuclear forces.
During the Cold War a number of countries acquired first generation theater ballistic missiles.
Scuds were used by Egypt in the 1973 war; more than six hundred Scuds were launched during the
Iran–Iraq war from 1987–1988; and at least two thousand Scuds were used by the Soviets in
Afghanistan between 1988 and 1991.32 Table 4 (Appendix) contains a list of countries that currently
have ballistic missile systems of concern to the United States.
One of the first observations to be made from an examination of this list is to note the shear
number of countries that have missiles. It should come as no surprise then to learn the missile
programs of one country have been aided by technology from a number of other countries. Iraq’s
missile program, for example, was the beneficiary of many years of assistance from Argentina, Brazil,
Germany, North Korea, and the USSR.33 With help from Brazilian technicians and extra fuel tanks
from North Korea, Iraq modified the Scud-B to extend its range to 600 kilometers creating a missile Iraq
called the al-Hussein. The approximately eighty-one “Scud” missiles Iraq launched during the Gulf War
were mostly al-Husseins. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had other modification programs underway to
create a 900 kilometers version (the al-Abbas) and a 2,000 kilometers three-stage vehicle (the al-Aabed)
as well. Iraq had announced in December 1989 that it had successfully completed the first test in the
development of this rocket.34 Finally, Iraq had a second program to develop a three-stage missile with
the assistance of several German companies using the two-stage Condor II from Argentina as a base.35
Another observation to be made from Table 4 (Appendix) is that a significant number of third
world countries have the Scud and Frog missiles. These missiles were obtained from the USSR, China,
or North Korea. Countries that have supplied assistance (technology, components, or both) to others
are shown in Table 2. Although most countries have depended upon outside help to begin their missile
development programs, a number of countries now have a largely indigenous missile program of their
own: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, North Korea, Libya, and Pakistan.
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Given that many countries have felt it necessary to acquire ballistic missiles and given that these
missiles are particularly threatening when armed with WMD, what course of action should the United
States take to improve its security as well as international security as a whole? I will answer this
question by first reviewing what has been done thus far to control the proliferation of WMDs as well as
the proliferation in ballistic missiles.
Geneva Protocol of 1925
Negotiations among many countries after World War I led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This
protocol prohibits the use of “Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.”36
However, the protocol does not ban production of these weapons and permits signatories to use
chemical and biological weapons against non-party states in retaliation against not observing the
provisions. Unfortunately, the Geneva Protocol has no compliance or verification regime. As of
January 1993, one-hundred and thirty countries were party to the Geneva Protocol.37
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968
Negotiations to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons were concluded in 1968 with the signing
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty divides the world into “haves” and “have-nots.”
Currently the declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) include the United States, Russia (as successor
to the USSR), the United Kingdom, France, and China. All other parties to the treaty are Non-Nuclear
Weapons States (NNWS). The NWS agree not to assist any state in acquiring nuclear weapons and
agree to assist NNWS with peaceful nuclear programs. The NNWS agree not to acquire nuclear
weapons, but may receive assistance and technology to develop nuclear power facilities or other non-
weapon related nuclear programs. Compliance with the treaty is verified with the assistance of
inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As of December 1993 there
were 162 NPT states.38
Biological Weapons Convention of 1975
After years of negotiations specifically devoted to ban the production of biological weapons, the United
States and USSR reached agreement on a convention in 1970 and subsequently submitted it to the
United Nations. The UN General Assembly approved a resolution commending the provisions of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that finally went into effect in 1975. This convention bans
development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological agents. As of January 1994 the BWC had
been ratified by 133 countries (some by accession or succession).39 Like the Geneva Protocol of 1925
that preceded it, the BWC makes no provision for verification and compliance. However, members are
currently considering proposed ways to establish formal verification procedures. A ban on production of
biological weapons is inherently difficult to verify because of the relative ease with which a state can
covertly develop biological weapons under the guise of a medical or biological research program. Such
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Table 2. Countries Supplying Missle Technology Assistance and/or Components
Countries Supplying Assistance Countries Receiving Assistance
Argentina Egypt, Iraq
Brazil China, Iraq, Libya
France Israel, Pakistan
Germany Brazil, Iraq, Libya
Israel South Africa
United States Israel, S Korea, Taiwan
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weapons can be produced from commonplace, readily available materials.
Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987
Concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missiles, seven Western states began negotiations in
1983 to seek export controls over ballistic and cruise missile technology. In 1987 they reached an
agreement called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR initially restricted
exports of missiles with a nuclear payload capability (500 kg was deemed the smallest practical weight
for a nuclear warhead) and a range greater than 300 kilometers (deemed the shortest range for tactical use
with a nuclear weapon). In 1993 MTCR membership approved changes to control the export of any
missile (or system) with a range greater than 300 kilometers regardless of payload. This change was
designed to expand the MTCR restrictions to cover chemical and biological weapons as well as crude
nuclear weapons that could be designed with a net warhead mass under 500 kg. As of December 1993,
twenty-five countries had joined the MTCR.40
Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
Following a path somewhat parallel to the BWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) resulted
from a series of U.S.–USSR (later U.S.–Russia) bilateral talks and was signed by 125 countries in
January 1993. The CWC will not go into force until two years after sixty-five or more states ratify the
treaty. Only four states had ratified the CWC as of January 1994.41 President Clinton forwarded the
treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification in April 1994.42 Compliance with the treaty will be verified
by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in a manner similar to the
IAEA for NPT.
Effectiveness of Non-Proliferation Efforts
How effective have these efforts been to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles or weapons of
mass destruction?
BWC: In January 1993 the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) issued a report
that said eight countries most likely had biological weapons programs and stockpiles (China, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Taiwan, Russia, and Syria) despite the fact they are signatories to the BWC.43 In the
case of Iraq, UN inspectors determined after the Gulf War that Iraq had conducted research, but had no
biological weapon productions program.44 Russia, on the other hand, has acknowledged its program
had, in fact, continued until 1992.45 Open sources list up to eight additional states beyond these listed
by ACDA that probably have clandestine offensive biological weapons.46 With the uncertainty it is
even possible to develop an adequate verification or compliance regime, it will be difficult to either
confirm or dispute the existence of such programs.
NPT::Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are believed to have the
capability to quickly produce them. None of these countries are members of NPT, nor does it seem
they are inclined to join anytime soon. North Korea, although a signatory of the NPT, is suspected of
having one or two nuclear weapons and of producing additional fissile material with the intent to
produce more nuclear weapons. For more than a year, North Korea has repeatedly blocked the IAEA’s
attempts to inspect certain facilities in accordance with its commitment under the NPT. Despite a year
of discussions among North Korea, the United States, China, and the United Nations and despite threats
of sanctions and loss of trade, North Korea continues to refuse the IAEA at the time of this writing.
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As mentioned earlier, Iraq—who had ratified NPT in 1969—had developed a much more extensive
nuclear weapons program before the Gulf War than had been suspected by outside observers. Open
sources identify ten undeclared nuclear weapons states either having or having previously had the intent
and capability to produce nuclear weapons.47 Two of these states, Argentina and Brazil have
subsequently declared their intent to cease pursuit of nuclear weapons; however, neither have joined the
NPT as of the time of this writing.48 South Africa declared it had produced six nuclear weapons, but
subsequently dismantled them; it joined the NPT as a NNWS in 1991. The activities of these states
demonstrate it is possible to skirt the NPT if a state is inclined to do so.
A handful of other states pose the potential for concern because of their modern technical
capabilities in spite of no present obvious intent to develop a nuclear weapon. This list includes Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan. In addition, there is a growing concern that a number of third world countries
will be able to purchase Russian nuclear weapons and material from Russian organized crime groups, if
reports prove true that organized crime is eroding the government’s control of its stockpile of nuclear
material.49
MTCR: The proliferation of ballistic missiles may have already surpassed the ability of the
MTCR to exercise any significant influence to reduce the number of states that are developing or
acquiring ballistic missiles (see Table 4, Appendix). In 1993 two incidents occurred that serve to
demonstrate how difficult it is to control the exportation of missile technology because of the
conflicting interests between export control and efforts to promote commercial trade or other national
goals. The first situation involved Russia that was pressured by the Clinton administration to break its
contract to supply India with liquid fueled (cryogenic) rocket engines and technology in support of
India’s space program. Instead of canceling the contract entirely, Russia will provide India with the
engines, but not the technical data that would allow India to produce its own liquid fueled engines. In
exchange, the United States made Russia a full partner in the U.S. led international space station and
pledged $400 million to support Russia’s space program.50 India responded with criticism of U.S.
intervention in its contract with Russia, but stated the interference had “only nuisance value”, and India
was “self-sufficient both in design and in missile technology.”51 Ironically, the space station program
faces the possibility of being canceled because of cost.52
The second incident concerns the U.S. accusation that China violated the MTCR by selling M-11
missiles to Pakistan. On 25 August 1993 the State Department issued a statement that the United
States would impose limited two-year sanctions on “munitions and dual use items, and denial of U.S.
government contracts” with China and Pakistan because of the missile transfer.53 China responded by
denouncing the sanctions as unjustified and based on “inaccurate intelligence.”54 In addition, the
sanctions impacted several U.S. space corporations with potential losses totaling more than $400
million in the sale of six satellites to China. In November 1993, the administration considered waiving
sanctions in exchange for a “promise” from China not to violate the MTCR again.55 However, the
administration decided in the end to let four of the six satellites go without constraint, deeming they
had no MTCR controlled components. The other two satellites contained MTCR controlled items,
which when replaced by alternate components, were also sold to China.
CWC: The CWC is not yet in force, but already a variety of open sources list up to eleven
countries believed to posses offensive chemical weapons capabilities.56 Only time will reveal if the
CWC will have greater effectiveness than either the BWC or NPT in limiting proliferation.
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Analysis of Nonproliferation Efforts and Threats
The result of the overall non-proliferation effort is a record of mixed success. No single effort has
stopped proliferation. At best, the non-proliferation regimes have made it more difficult, but not
impossible, for states to develop WMDs or ballistic missiles.
At the heart of the problem are two fundamental issues. The first relates specifically to the nature
of NPT. As long as the NPT retains its discriminatory nature that permits the five “Nuclear Club”
members to have nuclear weapons and denies other states the same opportunity, there will be states,
such as India, that will not join the NPT. India developed a nuclear capability in response to China’s
nuclear threat, as well as to make a statement to the world that India deserves respect as a prominent
state. As a state with almost one fifth of the world’s population, the largest democratic state in
existence, India sees the nuclear bomb as a ticket into the circle of world powers. What does India have
to gain by giving up this advantage and taking what it sees is a back row seat with the “third world”?
The other fundamental issue relates to nonproliferation efforts in general. States develop security
policies in response to their threat perceptions. For example, Pakistan has acquired a nuclear capability
primarily in response to India’s military strength and overall capability. Pakistan uses India as a reason
not to sign the NPT. But even if India was to join the NPT, Pakistan might nevertheless be tempted to
keep a nuclear production capability in response to India’s overall superiority in conventional forces for
the same reason NATO depended on tactical nuclear forces to balance the numerical superiority of the
Warsaw Pact. Having lost three wars with India that resulted in the loss of territory (East Pakistan and
land claims in Kashmir), Pakistan foreign policy reflects an acute awareness of the country’s strategic
vulnerability. Why should Pakistan give up its claim to nuclear weapons when it feels it has been put
at arms length by the United States whom it once viewed as a close friend and ally? The 1985 Pressler
Amendment to America’s Foreign Policy Assistance Act said aid to Pakistan would be contingent upon
the President’s ability to confirm Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb. American aid stopped after
1990 when it was no longer possible for the President to certify Pakistan did not have a nuclear
weapons program. As a consequence, Pakistan has yet to receive F-16s and other military equipment
for which it had previously paid $1.3 billion. It is not surprising Pakistan may feel that it cannot
depend upon the United States to protect its interests.57
These two issues, a state’s concept of what it must do to achieve world status or regional
recognition and the concept of what each state must do to preserve its national security, will forever
create challenges and frustrations for nonproliferation efforts. I do not suggest we should abandon
current nonproliferation efforts, but that one must be honest and acknowledge the reality of their limits.
Nonproliferation efforts, although commendable in many ways, have not eliminated the threat many
states face from ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads or WMD and cannot be expected
to do so entirely. For a variety of reasons, many countries are aggressively developing new theater
ballistic missiles with longer ranges and greater capabilities despite the MTCR.
The threat that drives the need for TMD capabilities may be summarized as follows: The Gulf War,
for the first time, brought the United States into an engagement with an enemy who possessed and used
theater ballistic missiles potentially armed with WMDs. Fortunately, Iraq did not use the chemical
missile warheads it had in stock, in contrast to its use of chemical armed artillery in the Iran–Iraq War.
More fortunately, Iraq had not yet achieved a nuclear capability. In light of the limitations of many
nonproliferation efforts and in light of the number of countries that have active programs to produce
better ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the United States cannot expect to be as
fortunate the next time around. The United States must develop a capable, mobile TMD system. While
it is true the United States proper is not directly threatened by any country with theater ballistic
missiles, if the United States deploys forces again to the Middle East, as it did in Dessert Storm, it will
find itself once again facing theater ballistic missiles. Similarly, U.S. forces in South Korea are under
the threat of ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. In addition, many of our allies are under an
increasing threat from theater ballistic missile in their regions. Clearly it is within the U.S. national
security interest to be able to assist its allies in meeting such threats.
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U.S. TMD Systems and the ABM Treaty
With the preceding assessment of the threat and a review of the limits of nonproliferation methods in
mind, I will now turn to a discussion of present and planned U.S. TMD systems. This discussion will
also address the current effort to clarify the ABM Treaty’s distinction between tactical TMD systems
and strategic ABM systems and address specific concerns that TMD efforts might undermine the ABM
Treaty and plunge the United States and Russia back into a strategic arms race. I will conclude this
discussion with recommendations to resolve these concerns and meet the growing threat from theater
ballistic missiles.
U.S. TMD Systems
What capability does the United States currently have to defend against ballistic missiles? Having
dismantled the Safeguard ABM system in 1976, the United States has been without any ABM defenses
against strategic missiles. The only U.S. theater ballistic missile defense system is the Army’s Patriot
missile system. The Patriot was originally designed by the U.S. Army in the 1960s as an anti-aircraft
missile. However, it was modified under a program that began in the early 1980s to give it a TMD
capability in response to the Soviet buildup of theater ballistic missiles in Europe. During the same
period, the Soviets modified some of their air defense missile systems for a similar TMD role (SA-10
and SA-12, for example).58
The first real test for any of these modified surface to air missile (SAM) systems was the Patriot’s
debut during the Gulf War. Early reports of the Patriot missile’s success in the Gulf War gave way after
the war to varying degrees of criticism about the missile’s overall performance in both Saudi Arabia
and Israel. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported to the Congress in April 1992 there was
insufficient data (in the GAO’s opinion) to support the U.S. Army’s claim that the success rate of the
Patriot was 80 percent in the Saudi Arabian theater and 50 percent in Israel.59 One of the most critical
reviews of the Patriot came from General Dan Shomron, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force
during the war. General Shomron stated in regards to the Patriots used to defend Israel, “I can say with
confidence that one Scud missile exploded in the air from a Patriot. And there were close hits and
diversions. But in the terms that I would define as success, I cannot talk about great successes.”60
Another assessment of the Patriot’s performance in Dessert Storm was done by Drs. Theodore
Postol and George Lewis of MIT who based their conclusions upon analysis of video taped Patriot
missile engagements. They stated “there is strong evidence that its interceptors failed to destroy a
significant number of attacking Scuds.”61 The Raytheon Company, which makes the Patriot missile,
refutes the Postol–Lewis analysis and supports the U.S. Army’s conclusions.62
However successful the Patriot was during the war, the operation served to highlight the need to
develop more capable TMD systems and focused attention on the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
WMDs. Since the war, the DOD has taken a number of significant steps to improve the Patriot and
develop an integrated TMD program that involves the efforts of all the services. This integrated effort,
under the direction of BMDO, uses a multi-layered defense architecture similar in principle to the
concept developed by SDIO and earlier against ICBMs. This integrated effort seeks ways to target
theater ballistic missiles throughout their time of flight from launch to a point just before impact.
Missile launches can be detected by Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites built during the
Cold War to detect launches of long burning, hot ICBM missile plumes. Despite their limited ability
to detect shorter burning and relatively cooler theater ballistic missiles, DSP satellites did provide allied
forces in the Gulf War with a limited amount of Scud launch data including general launch and impact
point locations. General Merrill McPeak, USAF Chief of Staff, commented that for the USAF in
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particular, Desert Storm “really opened our eyes” to the need for and use of space-based systems such as
DSP.63 As a result of the Gulf War, the USAF has initiated a intense effort to integrate information
from DSP and other satellites and aircraft equipped with advanced synthetic aperture radar, electro-
optical sensors, infrared sensors, and moving target radar with high speed communications and data
processing. In future conflicts, this integrated data would be sent near real-time to theater forces.64
Along with this effort is another USAF initiative to develop a high speed interceptor missile to be
carried by an airborne fighter or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and fired at a theater ballistic missile
during its boost phase. Integrated launch information from sensors in space will enable the fighter or
UAV to target the ballistic missile. Another more exotic air force program proposes to employ an
airborne laser to track and kill a ballistic missile during its boost phase.65 The USAF is also testing a
concept that will enable fighters to use integrated information to help them quickly locate and target
mobile launchers within minutes after a launch before they have time to relocate.66 The obvious
advantage of a boost phase intercept is the ballistic missile warhead is destroyed over the head of the
enemy. This opportunity is particularly important if the missile is carrying early release munitions or
any WMD because the dispersal of chemical or biological agents or nuclear fallout will be over enemy
territory.
The next layer of defense consists of a two-tier (upper and lower) TMD system being developed
primarily by the U.S. Army for land-based defense and the U.S. Navy for sea-based defense. The
purpose for the two tier system is to intercept intermediate range missiles (1,000 to 3,500 kilometers)
while they are above the atmosphere (above 100 kilometers ) before they arrive in the vicinity of their
intended target. As in the case of a boost phase intercept an upper tier, exo-atmospheric, intercept will
keep the dispersal of any chemical or biological agent or nuclear fallout as far away as possible. If the
missile is not intercepted until it approaches the intended target, a successful intercept might result in
the dispersal of some portion of the agent. The lower tier provides defense in depth to limit leakage. In
addition, the lower tier is also needed to target shorter range ballistic missiles (less than 1,000
kilometers) that spend most or all of their time of flight within the lower atmosphere.
The primary candidate system for land-based upper tier defense is the Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) being developed by the U.S. Army. For sea-based upper tier TMD, the U.S. Navy
is considering both the Army’s THAAD and another program called the Light Exo-Atmospheric
Projectile (LEAP).
The lower tier land-based TMD system is the Patriot. As previously mentioned the U.S. Army is
making improvements to the current Patriot system (radar, software, command and control, and
interceptor). Under a competitive program to improve the capabilities of the Patriot interceptor missile,
the U.S. Army recently selected the Loral Vought Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) over an
improved Patriot missile from Raytheon.67 The Army hopes to compliment the Patriot with an
additional, more mobile lower tier system called Corps SAM. The U.S. Navy is developing its sea-
based lower tier TMD by modifying its Standard Missile and Aegis SPY-1B radar that, like the Patriot,
was originally designed for an anti-aircraft role.68 Table 3 summarizes these TMD systems.
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Concerns about TMD and ABM Treaty Clarifications
Does this concept of a multi-layered TMD system potentially undermine the purpose of the ABM
Treaty? Recall from our discussion above the purpose of the ABM Treaty was to prohibit the United
States and the Soviet Union from developing national anti-strategic ballistic missile defense systems to
insure each party could survive a first strike from the other with enough strategic forces to retaliate.
However, the treaty does not define the term “strategic ballistic missile.”
The absence of such a definition caused no problem when the United States had no ABM
capability, theater or strategic. When the Patriot was modified to defend against short range theater
ballistic missile, this lack of definition also caused no problem because the Patriot posed no threat to
strategic ballistic missiles. But now, as the United States seeks to give greater capability to TMD
systems, the demarcation between “theater” and “strategic” becomes more important. If the United
States develops TMD systems with the capability to be used (or even potentially be used) in an ABM
role, as defined by the ABM Treaty, then it will have circumvented the treaty in a way that could
significantly undermine its purpose and value.
The recent discussions with Russia regarding the ABM Treaty are intended to clarify the
demarcation between ABM systems limited by the treaty and TMD systems not limited by the treaty.
The United States and Russia have both expressed a desire to keep the ABM Treaty alive, to limit
strategic ABM defenses for the same original reasons envisioned when the treaty was signed. The goal
of the discussions is to keep TMD systems from undermining the intent of the treaty.
Recommendations
What, then, should be the demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missiles? In 1972 the
United States and USSR had SLBMs in service with maximum ranges of less than 3,000 kilometers.69
SLBMs have always been treated as strategic missiles and included as part of the overall strategic force
structure whatever their range because their fundamental mission was the same as other longer range
ICBMs. However, when START II is completed, the United States and Russia will be left with no
strategic ballistic missiles with a shorter range than 6,500 kilometers.70
As Table 4 (Appendix) shows, the majority of theater ballistic missiles in existence or under
development have a range of less than 1,500 kilometers. Exceptions include ballistic missiles (in
existence or under development) in Brazil, China, India, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia. By selecting
3,500 kilometers as the boundary between “theater” and “strategic” ballistic missiles, the North Korean
Taepo Dong-2 falls within the targeted range of potential TMD missiles. This range does place the
French S-3D (3,500 kilometers ) within the classification of a theater ballistic missile, and the British
SLBM Polaris A-3 (4,600 kilometers ) and French SLBM M-4 (5,000) are only slightly beyond this
“theater” limit, which brings our discussion to a more difficult problem.
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Table 3. Summary of TMD Systems
Category of Intercept TMD System
BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT Fighter or UAV equipped with air-to-air missile
UPPER TIER INTERCEPT
Land-based THAAD
Sea-based THAAD or LEAP
LOWER TIER INTERCEPT
Land-based Patriot or ERINT, Corps SAM
Sea-based Standard Missile
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How can one distinguish a TMD system designed to kill a theater ballistic missile with a range of
3,500 kilometers from a system with some capability against a ballistic missile with a range of 4,600
kilometers (such as the British A-3), or for that matter, a missile with a range of 6,500 kilometers
(such as the Russian SS-N-18)? Recall that the ABM Treaty prohibits either party from giving non-
ABM systems the “capability” to counter strategic missiles. The problem with this stipulation is it
was written during a time in which there was less concern that a number of third world countries would
develop 1,500 to 3,500 kilometers range theater ballistic missiles. The treaty’s absence of a distinction
between strategic and theater reflects the fact the treaty was tailored for a situation in the Cold War that
is no longer current. In 1972 the United States and USSR perceived that the primary threat to their
national security was from each other’s growing ICBM and SLBM force. However, this East–West
Cold War focus has been diluted by a different situation today. A growing threat has arisen, particularly
for Russia, that comes from instability in Central, Eastern and Southern Asia as well as from the
Middle East. Although the possibility of a U.S. nuclear engagement with Russia has not been
eliminated, it is much more likely the next U.S. conflict will be a regional conflict involving theater
ballistic missiles from a country other than Russia. We have to face the fact that an effective TMD
system might have some degree of capability against a strategic ballistic missile. The solution
therefore is to:
(1) agree upon the demarcation between “theater” and “strategic”
(2) agree upon a qualitative limit for TMD systems
(3) seek to establish confidence building measures to reinforce each country’s commitment to
the ABM Treaty
(4) honor the ABM Treaty’s prohibition not to test a TMD system against a strategic missile.
There are several measures that can serve to build confidence that neither party is intentionally
giving ABM capabilities to TMD systems. One confidence-building measure (CBM) is to open all
TMD testing and operational training to observation from the other party. Such on-site observation
would insure that TMD systems are developed within agreed limits and that neither party is testing or
training operators to use TMD systems against strategic missiles. No country will put confidence in
any weapon system it has not tested nor expect its military to employ a weapon in a manner in which
they have not been trained.
Another CBM is to give full disclosure of the size, mobility, and location of each deployed TMD
system as well as prior notification of any redeployment. Garrison for TMD systems should not be in a
location that affords protection to either party’s ICBM fields or other strategic targets. Verification can
be done with on-site inspection as well as from spaced-based surveillance. Disclosure of critical
information about TMD systems would help to insure neither side is attempting to position TMD
systems in a manner to create a national ABM system.
A third CBM is to share early warning information. Current U.S. and Russian early warning
networks can provide processed data to each other through commercial links. General Charles Horner,
commander of U.S. Space Command (previously commander of air operations in the Gulf War),
described this CBM as a “vital step in building trust” because the United States would not give away
its early warning information if it wanted to preserve a first-strike capability.71
But what about U.S. allies, Britain and France? Even if the United States and Russia agree on a
demarcation between ABM and TMD systems, does such an agreement not force Britain and France to
accept that their shorter range SLBMs will be vulnerable to TMD systems? How about China? Should
the United States ignore the concern China may have if Russia develops TMD systems that would have
some potential capability against shorter range Chinese strategic missiles? I will answer these
questions indirectly by discussing the growing concerns Britain and France also have about the threat of
theater ballistic missiles.
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As previously mentioned, the United States and Russia—earlier the United States and USSR—are
discussing the possibility of sharing early warning information as well as the possibility of developing
joint TMD systems. The United States is also a party to similar discussions with NATO.72 In
addition, the United States has discussed TMD options with Japan73 and is cost sharing the
development of a TMD system (the Arrow) with Israel.74
In response to U.S.–Russian discussions about TMD, the WEU began its own talks in 1992 about
the need for a European TMD system.75 The WEU planned to consider participation in the Bush and
Yeltsin proposal of GPS as well as an independently developed European missile defense system citing
Libya, Syria, and Egypt as countries of particular concern. The WEU also directed its members to
conduct a study of a European TMD system based upon components of planned U.S. TMD systems. In
June 1993 the WEU passed a resolution to initiate, through the United Nations, the formation of an
international early warning and surveillance center.76
In September 1993 France initiated discussions with Russia to consider development of a
cooperative TMD system that would make use of Russian SA-12 technology.77 France sees this
cooperative initiative as an initial step toward developing a broad European TMD system designed to
defend against projected North African and Middle East ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,500 to 3,000
kilometers. Britain has also launched a study to examine its own requirements for a TMD capability
and plans to consider purchasing systems such as the U.S. THAAD and ERINT.78 It seems France and
Britain, even more than the United States, have reason to be concerned about the proliferation of
ballistic missile and WMDs.
All of these discussions underscore the shared view in Europe that there is a growing threat from
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMDs. There is general agreement between the United States
and Russia, and within NATO, that it is necessary to develop effective TMD systems to meet this
threat. Therefore, this mutual concern coupled with effective CBMs forms the basis for permitting
deployment in a way that will not undermine the ABM Treaty. China’s response is much more difficult
to determine. At some point China must be brought into the equation. On the positive side, China’s
inclusion creates the opportunity to address a possible long term solution to the threat of ballistic
missile proliferation.
Any long term solution must jointly consider the threat from nuclear weapons as well as ballistic
missiles. To arrive at a long term solution, the United States should initiate a comprehensive round of
talks with NATO, Russia, China, other U.S. allies such as Japan and Israel, and with the members of
the MTCR to agree upon a time frame to ban all ballistic missiles and ultimately to eliminate all
nuclear weapons. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed in 1987 by the United
States and the Soviet Union has already demonstrated the potential of such a ban with its elimination
of all U.S. and USSR ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. As the next
step toward a total ban on all missiles, other countries should be invited to join the INF treaty. To
compliment this effort, the United States should create a framework that provides early warning
information to other states and allows them to purchase TMD systems in exchange for their
demonstrated commitment to eliminate ballistic missiles and WMD. This framework might initially
include an international early warning center and could evolve to include several centers (U.S., Europe,
Russia, and Asia). Another option would be to provide early warning information via commercial
satellites to member states. Cooperative warning can be developed using present U.S. and Russian
early warning systems. Other states with surveillance systems (French Spot satellite for example) could
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be invited to share information that can be used to provide verification and compliance assurance to
members of the organization. The center would not replace, but rather would augment the work of
existing verification and compliance regimes such as IAEA for NPT and OPCW for CWC.
During the Cold War the United States justified building and deploying a nuclear arsenal because it
believed the country needed a force multiplier to deter a numerically superior Soviet force. The United
States must now realize that other countries are using the same logic to justify programs to develop
their own weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. But as the Gulf War
demonstrated, the United States no longer needs nuclear weapons as a force multiplier. Precision air
power clearly brought Saddam Hussein to his knees with less collateral damage and injury to civilians
than during any previous military campaign. The United States did not need nuclear weapons during the
Gulf War and will not need them in the future except as a deterrent to other states who have them or
might acquire them Our only current justification for keeping strategic weapons, especially ICBMs and
SLBMs, is because Russian and China possess them. General McPeak has described ballistic missiles
as “destabilizing, because they leave virtually no time for questions” and evoke “a use-it-or-loose-it
kind of psychology” on the receiving end.79 A discussion among the five declared NWS—all have
ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads—could lead to a joint agreement similar to the START
agreements that would ultimately eliminate all ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. This effort
would provide credibility to our appeals for states like India and Pakistan to join NPT as NNWS.
Summary
The ABM Treaty was designed to limit U.S. and Soviet defenses against strategic missiles in order to
contain the nuclear arms race. It has performed this task very well. As our discussion has shown,
however, the ABM Treaty did not reduce the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic warheads; but by
limiting missile defenses, the treaty contributed to deterrence by giving each party a reasonable
guarantee it could survive a first strike from the other. As long as the United States and Russia possess
strategic missiles, the ABM Treaty continues to fulfill this purpose.
Since the treaty was signed in 1972, the world has witnessed a significant increase in the number
of and use of theater ballistic missiles. Despite a coordinated effort on the part of many states to limit
the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the MTCR, the spread continues. Efforts to control the
proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads has produced mixed results. Until such time
as it is clear that U.S. forces are not likely to face threats from theater ballistic missiles potentially
armed with WMDs, as they did in the Gulf War, the United States needs to have a highly effective
theater missile defense capability. Although the primary theater ballistic missile threat today is from
short range ballistic missiles, several countries are developing intermediate range theater ballistic
missiles that will likely be exported to other countries. The United States needs to be prepared to meet
this longer range threat as it develops.
Given that the ABM Treaty did not offer a clear distinction between limited strategic ABM defenses
and unrestricted TMD systems, the United States and Russia must clarify this distinction. The United
States and Russia, as well as our closest allies, must accept the fact that it is not possible to create
effective TMD systems that simultaneously have no capability against strategic ballistic missiles.
Therefore, this effort to agree on mutually acceptable TMD capabilities should include confidence-
building measures to help reinforce the commitment to abide by the basic purpose of the ABM Treaty.
We have discussed the fact that some states have a ballistic missile and a nuclear weapons program
or both as a result of a desire to achieve world or regional prominence. Other states have similar
programs in response to the threat they perceive from neighboring states. A number of countries are
unlikely to agree to abandon their nuclear weapons programs as long as the NPT divides the world into
“haves” and “have-nots.” In recognition of this fact, the United States should seek a more permanent
long-term solution to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons although a series of
international discussions to establish a time frame for a ban on all ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons. This ban can be enhanced by an offer to share early warning information and TMD systems
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to member states in order to reinforce each member’s commitment to the ban. While this effort will
not eliminate a threat from other delivery vehicles (such as aircraft, cruise missiles, and artillery), it
will eliminate the most destabilizing threat of ballistic missiles. Only if the United States takes the
lead in this effort and if other nuclear weapons states agree will it be likely that the threat of ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear weapons will cease. Until that time, the threat will continue to grow and
states will continue to take the action they believe necessary to defend their interests.
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Appendix
Table 4. Countries with Ballistic Missiles of Concern to the United States
Country Missile Range(KM) Comments
Afghanistan Frog-7
Scud-B
70
300
Algeria Frog-4
Frog-7
50
70
Argentina Alacran
Condor I
Condor II
200
95
900
D
D
Agreed to stop production under MTCR; being dismantled
Brazil MB/EE-150
SS-300
MB-EE/350
MB-EE/600
MB-EE/1000
SS-1000
IRBM
Sonda 3
Sonda 4
VLS
150
300
350
600
1,000
1,200
3,000
80
950
10,000
D
D
D
D
D
D
Planned
Sounding Rocket
Sounding Rocket
D?
Bulgaria Frog-7
Scud-B
SS-23
70
300
500
China M-7
M-11
M-9
M-18
CSS-N-3 (JL-1)
DF-25
CSS-5 (DF21)
CSS-2 (DF-3)
CSS-3 (DF-4)
JL-2
DF-31
CSS-4 (DF-5)
DF-41
180
300
600
1,000
1,700
1,700
1,800
2,800
7,000
8,000
8,000
12,000
12,000
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
Croatia Scud-B 300
Cuba Frog-7 70
Czech and
Slovak Republics
Frog-7
SS-21
Scud-B
SS-23 ?
70
120
300
500
Egypt Frog-7
Scud-B
Project T
Vector
Scud-100
70
300
450
600
600
D
D
D
Hungary Frog-7
Scud-B
70
300
India Centaure
Rohini
Prithvi (SS-150)
Prithvi (SS-250)
SLV-3
Agni
ASLV
PSLV
GSLV
50
130
250
800
2,500
4,000
8,000
12,000
Sounding Rocket
Sounding Rocket
Space Launch Vehicle
D
Space Launch Vehicle
Space Launch Vehicle
Planned Space Launch Vehicle
(continues)
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Table 4. (continued)
Country Missile Range(KM) Comments
Indonesia RX-250
SLV (?)
100
1,500
D, Sounding Rocket
Planned
Iran Shahin-2
Nazeat
Mushak-120
Iran-130
Mushak-160
Iran-200
Mushak-200
8610
Scud-B
Scud-C
Iran-700
Tondar-68
NoDong-1 ?
60
120
120
130
160
200
200
300
300
500
700
1,000
1,000
D
D
D
Iraq Frog-7
Laith
Nissan
65
90
110
D
D, UN resolution limits Iraq to missiles with ranges less
than 150 kilometers
Israel Mar-350
Lance
Jericho I
Jericho II
Jericho IIb
Shavit
40–150
130
650
1,500
1,300
2,500 Space Launch Vehicle
Japan M-3
H-1
H-2
4,000
12,000
15,000
Space Launch Vehicle
Space Launch Vehicle
Space Launch Vehicle
Kuwait Frog-7 70
Libya Frog-7
SS-21 ?
Scud-B
Otrag
Ittisalt
Al-Fateh
NoDong-1
70
120
300
480
700
950
1,000
D
D
North Korea Frog-5
Frog-7
Scud-B
Scud-C
NoDong-1
NoDong-2
Taepo Dong-1
Taepo Dong-2
50
70
300
500
1,000
2,000
2,000
3,500
D
D
Planned
Planned
Pakistan Haft I
Shahpar
Suparco
M-11?
Haft II
Haft III
??
SLV
80
120
280
280
300
600
640
1,200
Sounding Rocket
Sounding Rocket
D
D
Space Launch Vehicle
Planned Space Launch Vehicle
Poland Frog-7
SS-21
Scud-B
70
120
300
Romania Frog-7
Scud-B
70
300
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 2,650
(continues)
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Table 4. (continued)
Country Missile Range(KM) Comments
South Africa Jericho II
Arniston
1,450
1,500
South Korea Honest John
NHK-1
NHK-2
37
180
260 D
Serbia Frog-7 70
Spain Capricornio 1,300 D
Syria Frog-7
SS-21
Scud-B
Scud-C
M-9
NoDong-1 ?
65
120
300
500
600
1,000
Taiwan Honest John
Ching Feng
Tien Ma ?
37
100
950
Turkey Honest John
ASR-227
37
150
United Arab Emirates Scud-B 300
Vietnam Scud-B 300
Yemen Frog-7
SS-21
Scud-B
65
120
300
Source: Information compiled from a variety of sources: Arms Control Reporter (1993): 706.E.7-11 and
(1994): 706.E.1-8; Arms Control Today (April 1994): 29–30; Barbara Starr, “N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow
with TD-2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 1; The Military Balance 1992–1993: 236.
Comments: This list of missiles includes sounding rockets, space launch vehicles, and missile development
programs some of which may have been discontinued. All three categories are included because the
technology is largely common to a ballistic missile program and thus reflects an overall capability for a
given country. The list does not include Russia or any other former republics of the USSR. Missile range
varies with the source.
Notes: D, in development.
